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INTRODUCTION
	 This	is	a	paper	concerned	with	matters	of	morality,	particularly	with	
how	“People	of	the	Center”	(Medio	Caquetá	region,	Colombian	Amazon)1	
talked	about	the	admirable,	the	worthy,	the	despicable,	and	the	evil	in	agents’	
practices,	actions	and	subjectivities.		It	features	an	abstract	discussion	that	
presents	my	own	interpretive,	schematic	synthesis	of	People	of	the	Center’s	
understandings	or	accounts	of	morality	and	cosmology,	but	also	and	more	
centrally	addresses	how	individuals	reflected	on	these	accounts	and	used	
them	 intelligently,	 reiterating	 them,	 contesting	 them,	 and	 transforming	
them.2		Men	and	women	among	Muinane	and	other	People	of	the	Center	
produced	numerous	discursive	depictions	of	themselves,	of	others,	and	of	
their	 interactions,	often	concerning	 their	own	competence	and	morality	
or	 others’	 lacks	 thereof.	 	These	 moral	 portrayals	 of	 themselves	 and	 of	
others—whether	in	the	form	of	brief	anecdotes	or	longer	narratives—were	
told	to	me	frequently	and	explicitly	during	the	time	I	spent	in	Muinane	
communities.	 	As	 a	 result,	 I	 soon	 lost	my	 initial	 culture	 shock	 at	 such	
apparent	 immodesty	 and	 shrewishness.	 	 I	 started	 to	 think	 about	 such	
moral	portrayals	as	a	matter	of	puzzlement	and	then	focused	on	them	as	
examples	of	people	citing	much-used	narrative	 frames	and	symbols.	 	 In	
this	paper	I	attend	selectively	to	a	particular	set	of	portrayals	and	practices	
that	 pertain	mainly	 to	men:	 those	 concerning	 forms	 of	 knowledge	 that	
Muinane	 people	 deemed	 their	 own	 and	 different	 from	 other	 people’s.	
In	 this	 regard	 the	mambeadores	 (adult	 men	 who	 consumed	 ritually	 the	
substance	mambe3)	stressed	the	great	amount	of	knowledge	they	possessed,	
the	authentically	Muinane	or	patrilineal	character	of	this	knowledge,	the	
propriety	of	their	processes	of	acquisition	of	it,	the	legitimacy	of	their	use	
of	it,	its	effectiveness,	and	the	respect	and	fear	others	had	of	them	because	
of	 it.	 	 Women	 too	 produced	 numerous	 self-depictions,	 but	 expressed	
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less	of	an	obsession	with	 their	own	agency,	and	no	claims	 to	dangerous	
knowledge.	 	Most	of	 the	People	of	 the	Center	 I	 knew—both	men	and	
women—also	 produced	 numerous	 negative	 evaluations	 of	 other	 people,	
concerning	the	same	issues.		They	surreptitiously	and	openly	denied	the	
amount,	 effectiveness,	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 others’	 knowledge,	 good	 will,	
formal	correctness,	and	so	on.		They	often	found	“proof ”	of	others’	lack	of	
knowledge	and	of	their	misdemeanors.		
	 I	was	curious	about	why	individuals	among	the	People	of	the	Center	
produced	such	moral	portrayals,	and	about	what	these	expressions	achieved.	
I	will	attempt	here	to	make	the	case	that	they	were	motivated	by	a	certain	
ideal	 of	 agency,	 a	 sense	 of	 what	 was	 admirable	 or	 desirable	 in	 human	
subjectivity	and	action,	tied	to	their	awareness	of	the	possibility	that	their	
own	actions	and	subjectivities	would	be	framed	as	immoral,	animalistic	or	
otherwise	inadequate	by	others	around	them.		The	latter	interpretations,	
often	voiced	critically,	were	always	a	risk	among	them4	(see	Storrie	intra,	
on	people’s	judgments	of	claims	to	awesome	shamanic	power).
	 Individuals	 among	 the	 People	 of	 the	 Center	 produced	 moral	 self-
portrayals	reflexively,	at	times	with	self-conscious	intent	to	persuade,	yet	
usually	without	questioning	the	given	nature	of	the	performative	categories	
posited	by	the	vocabulary	in	which	these	portrayals	were	couched.		They	
were	very	aware	 that	 their	ways	and	actions	were	 likely	 to	be	evaluated	
by	others,	and	in	fact	many	of	their	moral	self-portrayals	took	the	form	
of	quotations	of	what	others—kin,	but	also	the	dead	and	other	kinds	of	
beings—had	purportedly	 said	about	 them.	 	My	conviction	 is	 that	 these	
discourses—along	 with	 other	 discursive	 and	 nondiscursive	 practices	 of	
knowledge	 that	 featured	 or	 were	 spoken	 of	 with	 a	 detailed	 vocabulary	
of	strong	moral	evaluation5	—created	and	recreated	the	very	nature	and	
intelligibility	of	the	kinds	of	agents	People	of	the	Center	understood	they	
were	or	could	be.		Furthermore,	these	kinds	of	agents	were	intelligible	to	the	
People	of	the	Center	in	the	frame	of	a	certain	kind	of	cosmos,	constructed	
dialogically	 through	 the	 same	 reiterative	 symbolic	 deployments	 that	
constructed	the	agents.		Part	of	what	persuades	me	that	this	was	so	was	the	
great	coherence—or	even	identity—between	People	of	the	Center’s	ways	
of	acting	upon	the	world	“out	there,”	their	ways	of	acting	upon	individuals’	
bodies	and	subjectivities,	and	their	reflexive	talk	concerning	these	matters	
and	their	own	and	others’	actions.		These	pictures	of	the	world,	of	agency	
and	of	subjectivity	within	them,	were	compelling.		People	appeared	to	feel,	
and	 they	 certainly	 interacted,	 in	ways	 that	 cohered	with	 a	 very	 unique,	
complex	kind	of	cosmos.		This	life	indeed	had	a	hold	on	them.6		
	 I	argue	that	a	“thick”	understanding	of	social	life	of	the	People	of	the	
Center—including	in	its	dense	complexity	the	moral	self-portrayals	that	first	
2
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engaged	my	curiosity,	but	also	more	“traditional”	anthropological	matters	
such	as	the	vicissitudes	of	their	social	organization	or	cosmology—requires	
attention	to	the	subjectivity	of	individuals,	to	their	motivations,	and	to	their	
self-interpretations,	all	of	which	were	partly	shaped	and	constituted	by	their	
articulated	understandings	of	agency,	emotions,	morality,	and	so	forth.		I	
cannot	produce	a	watertight	causal	account	of	how	the	picture	of	agency	
in	question	came	to	have	a	hold	upon	people,	how	it	was	transformed	into	
individuals’	desires	or	callings,	into	the	experienced	wish	or	aspiration	to	
be	a	certain	kind	of	agent	or	to	be	perceived	as	such.		I	assume	the	position	
that	my	understandings	of	 the	 subjectivities	of	 individual	People	of	 the	
Center	are	inevitably	based	on	my	understandings	of	my	own	subjectivity,	
which	 itself	 is	 formed	 in	 social	 interaction.	 	 I	 experience	 many	 of	 my	
beliefs,	desires,	and	motivations	as	manifestly	obvious.		Probably	because	
of	the	symbolic	forms	that	I	have	acquired	over	the	course	of	my	life	that	
constitute	or	shape	my	interpretations,	I	simply	see	that	certain	forms	of	
action	and	subjectivity,	as	well	as	certain	personal	styles	are	desirable	and	
worthy.		Seeing	them	in	this	way	constitutes	a	motivation	to	act	in	a	certain	
way.		I	also	have	a	clear	sense	that	many	of	my	actions	depend	on	choices	
and	decisions	I	make	reflexively,	employing	distinctions	of	worth.		Because	
I	recognize	this	in	my	own	action,	I	suppose	that	other	people	act,	often	
reflexively,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 understandings	 (or	misunderstandings)	
of	 themselves	 and	of	 the	world.7	 	They	 too	 see (and	 intimately	 believe)	
that	certain	forms	of	action	and	subjectivity	are	admirable	or	despicable,	
though	these	may	well	differ	from	the	forms	I	admire	or	despise.
	 In	 the	 pages	 that	 follow,	 I	 will	 present	my	 synthetic	 interpretation	
of	 People	 of	 the	Center’s—sometimes	 specifically	Muinane’s—accounts	
of	how	the	“knowledge	of	our	own”	and	associated	practices	 relate	with	
their	 cosmos,	 social	 organization,	 subjectivities	 and	 understandings	 of	
agency.		I	will	then	turn	to	an	examination	of	the	moral	issues	pertaining	
to	knowledge,	as	expressed	in	individuals’	morally	evaluative	portrayals	of	
their	own	and	others’	actions	and	agencies.	
	
ACCOUNTS OF SELVES, THE COSMOS, AND AGENCY
	 Muinane	people’s	talk	often	depicted	or	alluded	to	a	cosmos	densely	
populated	by	a	variety	of	suprahuman,	human,	and	pseudo-	or	infrahuman	
agents.		Such	talk	also	segregated	these	beings	on	moral	grounds.		Although	
in	some	ways	many	had	some	features	of	humanity,	only	miyámiinaha—
literally	meaning	“Real	People”	(Muinane	and	those	akin	to	them)—were	
proper	 human	 beings	 with	 the	 capacity	 to	 live	 as	 such	 beings	 should.	
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Animals	and	some	other	kinds	of	beings	to	some	extent	perhaps	viewed	
themselves	as	human,	but	failed	on	moral	grounds	to	achieve	true	humanity.	
Individuals	expressed	this	moral	classification	most	saliently	in	the	form	of	
manifest	evaluations	of	immoral	action	on	the	part	of	people	to	whom	they	
attributed	 animalistic	 thoughts/emotions	 (see	Londoño	 Sulkin	 2005:7–
30).		
	 According	 to	 several	mambeadores	 I	 asked,	 the	 ultimate	 purpose	 of	
human	life	was	to	reproduce	“humanity”—a	term	that	could	encompass	
the	 kinship	 group,	 People	 of	 the	 Center,	 or	 the	 human	 species	 more	
generally.		This	reproduction	involved	the	intentional	manufacture	of	new	
people	 endowed	 with	 the	 sociable	 subjectivities	 and	 competent	 bodies	
necessary	to	conduct	community	life	as	it	should	be	conducted:	interacting	
coolly	and	caringly	in	everyday	life.		The	constitution	of	individual	Real	
People	was	thus	a	central	and	often	explicit	concern	in	much	social	action.	
Many	 standard	 activities	 in	Muinane	people’s	 lives—whether	 quotidian	
or	occasional,	ceremonial	or	not—related	to	this.		A	common	premise	of	
much	of	what	they	said	and	did	was	that	people’s	material	constitution,	
by	 the	 substances	 that	 they	 stated	made	 up	 the	 body,	 determined	 their	
subjectivities	 and	 agencies.	 	 Key	 cultivated	 substances	 such	 as	 tobacco,	
coca,	hot	chilies,	manioc	and	so	forth	were	made	into	human	flesh	through	
rituals	and	through	simple	consumption	in	everyday	life;	these	substances,	
of	divine	origin	and	endowed	with	their	own	subjectivities	and	agencies,	
“spoke	 through”	 people,	 generating	 their	moral	 thoughts/emotions	 and	
bodily	sensations.		
	 The	 very	 materiality	 of	 people’s	 subjectivities	 and	 agencies	 made	
them	vulnerable	to	the	evil	of	animals	and	other	inhuman	beings,	whom	
my	 interlocutors	 among	People	 of	 the	Center	 often	 accused	 of	 placing	
their	 own	 perverse,	 subjectivity-endowing	 substances	 inside	 people,	 or	
otherwise	 impinging	upon	people’s	bodily	health.	 	On	several	occasions	
I	witnessed,	when	people	became	physically	incapable	of	contributing	to	
the	material	well-being	of	 the	 community,	or	 else	behaved	 in	 antisocial	
fashions,	others	and	at	times	they	themselves	would	claim	that	this	was	the	
result	of	an	animal’s	usurpation	of	their	thoughts/emotions,	and	of	their	
speech.		People’s	actions	were	often	the	matter	of	contested	interpretations,	
concerning	whether	they	were	proper	human	conduct	or	rather	the	product	
of	the	immoral,	beastly	usurpation	of	their	subjectivities.		Their	perspectival	
cosmology—where	 beings	 perceive	 themselves	 and	 those	 with	 bodies	
like	their	own	as	“human”—provided	a	frame	in	which	such	accusations	
were	plausible.		People	with	animalistic	subjectivities	could	perceive	other	
beings	 who	 had	 bodies	 like	 their	 own	 as	 “human,”	 but	 would	mistreat	
them	 in	 the	 fashion	 that	 animals	 and	other	 inhuman	beings	mistreated	
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their	 co-specifics,	 whom	 they	 too	 perceived	 as	 “human”	 (see	 Londoño	
Sulkin	2005:7–30,	for	a	more	thorough	discussion	of	Viveiros	de	Castro’s	
1998	essay	on	perspectivism).	 	 In	 the	 context	of	 communities	 in	which	
such	accusations	were	rife,	people	invested	much	in	highlighting	their	own	
consistent	humanity	and	morality,	to	preempt	unfavorable	interpretations.	
(For	further	discussion	on	perspectivism,	see	Belaunde,	Lagrou,	Rosengren,	
Santos-Granero,	Storrie,	and	Werlang,	all	intra.)	
	 What	I	interpret	to	be	People	of	the	Center’s	understanding	of	their	
own	agency—an	important	part	of	which	was	the	capacity	to	manipulate	
substances	or	their	bearers	either	materially	or	through	persuasion—is	built	
upon	first,	the	premises	of	the	materiality	of	moral	thoughts/emotions	and	
properly	shaped	bodies	and	of	their	corrupt	counterparts,	and	second,	upon	
the	subjectivity	of	the	bearers	of	these	materials.		This	capacity	stemmed	
from	key	substances	such	as	tobacco	paste,	coca,	hot	chilies,	water,	herbs,	
and	others	 that	were	agents	 in	 their	own	right	and	endowed	with	 their	
own	intentionality.		Many	of	the	manipulations	in	question	were	conceived	
as	predatory	 transformations	 that	 involved	dealing	out	death.	 	Tobacco,	
itself	a	powerful	predator,	was	perhaps	the	most	important	source	of	such	
predatory	agency.		In	constituting	people’s	bodies	it	provided	them	not	only	
with	thoughts/emotions,	but	also	with	some	of	its	predatory	capabilities.	
Furthermore,	 people—mainly	 the	mambeadores,	 but	 for	 a	 few	 purposes	
some	 women	 as	 well—used	 what	 I	 call	 instrumental	 “Speeches,”	 the	
Speeches	of	Life,	of	Healing,	of	Apprising,	of	Work,	of	Felling,	of	Maloca	
Construction,	of	Pain	and	others,	with	their	protocols	and	conditions,	to	
direct	the	agency	of	the	tobacco	they	consumed	so	that	it	would	prey	upon	
evil	agents	and	their	substances,	and	thereby	transform	them	with	some	
people-making	 or	 community-making	 purpose	 (on	 such	 purposes,	 see	
Londoño	Sulkin	2000:170–186	 and	2001:434;	 and	Overing	 and	Passes	
2000).		
	 The	 instrumental	Speeches	were	part	of	what	People	of	 the	Center	
referred	 to	 in	 Spanish	 as	 el conocimiento propio,	 the	 “knowledge	 of	 our	
own.”8	 	 In	 my	 experience,	Muinane	 people	 used	 the	 term	 “knowledge	
of	our	own”	mostly	to	contrast	it	with	the	Speeches	and	other	privileged	
discourses	 and	 techniques	 of	white	men.	 	 I	 should	 note	 parenthetically	
that	most	Muinane	men	possessed	some	“knowledge	of	our	own,”	but	by	
the	time	I	did	my	fieldwork	there	were	no	specialized	shamans	alive	of	the	
kind	called	kakúminaha	(sucking	people),	who	were	reportedly	capable	of	
extracting	diseases	from	people	through	suction.		Some	Muinane	people	
did	recognize	certain	known	Matapí,	Yukuna,	Uitoto,	Okaina,	and	Makuna	
individuals	to	be	specialized	healers	or	sorcerers.9		
	 The	 different	 instrumental	 Speeches	 pertained	 to	 numerous	 fields	
5
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of	endeavour	and	to	different	moments	 in	 life.	 	They	were	more	or	 less	
formulaic	utterances	that	mambeadores understood	to	act	in	different	ways	
to	 change	 some	 aspect	 of	 the	 world.	 	My	 interlocutors	made	 different	
claims	about	 them—that	 they	were	 the	very	speech	of	 the	creator	deity	
sounding	directly	through	the	speaker,	or	that	they	were	“recordings”	(akin	
to	those	on	a	cassette	tape)	of	the	Creator’s	words,	or	that	they	directed	the	
attention	of	the	creator	deity	to	some	transformation	that	people	wanted	
him	 (or	 her,	 depending	 on	 the	 clan	 of	 the	 person	 telling	 the	 story)	 to	
carry	out.	 	Alternatively	 the	spoken	utterances	 themselves	were	deemed	
to	be	powerful,	or	somehow	able	to	harness	the	agency	of	substances	(for	
a	 similar	 description	 of	 people	 using	 alternative	 accounts,	 see	Tambiah	
1968:183).
	 Real	People’s	transformations	of	misanthropic	agents,	their	substances,	
their	 thoughts/emotions	 and	 their	 agencies	 into	 their	 proper	 human	
counterparts	 seemed	 to	 involve	 two	main	 forms	of	manipulation.	 	One	
was	the	material	manipulation	of	substances	and	agents,	or	of	substance-
like	 agencies,	 thoughts/emotions	 and	 tribulations.	 	The	other	 form	was	
the	social	manipulation	of	subjectivity-endowed	beings,	which	often	led	
to	their	effecting	material	manipulations.		
	 The	manipulation	of	agents	and	substances	was	often	a	matter	of	what	
I	have	called	“divine	performativity”	(following	Butler	1993:12,	13).		For	
the	case	of	Muinane	people’s	practices,	I	will	define	this	as	the	capacity	of	
agents	to	bring	about	transformations	in	the	world	by	means	of	naming	
or	otherwise	describing	these	transformations.		The	effects	named	come	
to	be	in	virtue	of	the	will	of	the	subject	that	does	the	naming.		A	common	
example	of	such	divine	performativity	took	place	in	most	evening	rituals	
in	Muinane	mambeaderos,	which	usually	involved	the	recapitulation	of	the	
evils	that	had	affected	the	community	that	day,	or	that	could	do	so	on	the	
following	one.		Each	of	these	evils	was	then	dealt	with	in	the	mambeadores’	
rhythmic	 dialogues,	 which	 at	 some	 stage	 involved	 lists	 of	 statements,	
including	 metalinguistic	 ones	 about	 the	 statements’	 effectiveness	 that	
affirmed	 that	 these	 evils	 were	 being	 swept	 away,	 proscribed,	 or	 blown	
away.10	
	 Another	 form	 of	 divine	 performativity	 was	 the	 use	 of	 “naming.”	
Ovikihi	(to	aim),	mómonihi	(to	name),	and ímijisuhi	(to	name	into	good/	
beautiful),	were	several	forms	of	naming	that	Muinane	people	understood	
to	generate	 the	 effects	named.	 	An	example	of	 such	performativity	was	
the	“naming	of	the	flesh”	of	certain	dangerous	fish,	transforming	the	fish	
into	manioc.		People	understood	this	to	transform	the	original	substance,	
pre-empting	 its	 more	 dangerous	 characteristics.	 	The	 fish’s	 pathogenic	
features	 were	 disarmed	 because	 processed	 manioc	 was	 not	 pathogenic.	
6
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Several	of	my	mambeadero	interlocutors	were	explicit	about	the	fact	that	
naming	 could	 be	 very	 dangerous,	 and	much	more	 so	when	 effected	 by	
knowledgeable	 elders	 such	 as	 themselves,	 empowered	with	 tobacco	 and	
coca.		Immanuel	broached	this	matter	after	reproaching	me	one	time	for	
calling	an	airplane	a	“fire	eagle”	(kííjigai mogáje),	the	term	that	some	other	
clans	used	for	planes.		He	said,	“Do	not	name	it	that	way	…	that	is	why	
they	fall	and	burn!		Call	it	kámoga	(“canoe	of	the	heights”).11	
	 Many	 salient	 endeavors	 among	Muinane	 and	 other	 People	 of	 the	
Center	made	some	use	or	another	of	this	transformative,	predatory	agency	
(Echeverri	2000;	Londoño	Sulkin	2000	and	2001b;	Overing	and	Passes	
2000).	 	Food	and	 ritual	 substance	preparations	were	often	 spoken	of	 as	
filtering	or	purifying	processes	in	which	some	agent—water,	fire,	or	some	
other	 subjectivity-endowed	 substance	 or	 object—killed,	 destroyed,	 or	
otherwise	 did	 away	with	 pathogens	 in	 the	 original	 stuff,	 leaving	 only	 a	
purified	desirable	essence.		The	felling	and	burning	of	the	forest	to	make	a	
garden	was	treated	in	the	Speech	of	Felling	as	a	human	war	against	trees,	
or	alternatively	as	a	meal	in	which	the	deities	of	tobacco,	axes	and	fire	all	
“ate”	evil	trees,	transforming	them	into	fertile	ashes	from	which	desirable	
substances	would	grow.		Speeches	of	Healing	that	dealt	with	disease	usually	
involved	the	use	of	tobacco	paste	and	coca,	understood	in	the	first	place	
to	be	the	source	and	power	of	knowledge,	and	then	to	be	predators	that	
transformed	the	evil	substances	affecting	the	sick	and	placed	them	again	
in	the	animals	that	had	originated	them.		These	animals	then	became	easy	
prey	 for	people.	 	Finally,	 the	building	of	malocas	 (traditional	ceremonial	
and	residential	houses)	involved	numerous	transformations	of	diseases	and	
negative	 affects	 into	 elements	 of	 the	 house,	 and	 the	 “domestication”	 of	
evil	 agents	 such	 as	 the	 great	 trees	 that	 became	 house	 pillars	 or	 drums.	
According	 to	mambeadores’	metacommentaries	on	 the	Speech	of	Maloca	
Construction,	 once	 it	 transformed	 them	 into	 a	 house,	 these	 elements	
became	protective	guardians	 that	ensured	 the	health	and	 fertility	of	 the	
maloca’s	inhabitants.		
	 Such	views	of	the	cosmos	and	of	agency	within	it	appeared	often	in	
People	 of	 the	 Center’s	 emotional	 talk	 and	moral	 portrayals.	 	 It	 always	
seemed	 to	 me	 to	 be	 an	 intimately	 persuasive	 account	 of	 experienced	
thoughts/emotions,	 and	 elsewhere	 I	 discuss	 in	 detail	 cases	 of	 people	
deeming	their	own	and	others’	behaviors	to	be	the	product	of	animalistic	
usurpation	of	proper	human	thoughts/emotions.		The	possibility	of	such	
usurpation	contextualized	claims	to	knowledge,	morality	and	agency,	for	
it	was	both	the	main	object	of	the	intentional	use	of	knowledge,	and	the	
main	 claim	 in	 critiques	 of	 allegedly	 immoral	 behavior.	 	The	 claims	 in	
question	also	seemed	to	me	to	convey	the	deep	aesthetic	involvement	of	
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People	of	the	Center	(especially	the	men)	with	a	certain	picture	of	agency	
that	 involved	on	 the	one	hand	manifesting	great	 tranquility,	 competent	
sociability	and	concerned	care	for	others,	and	on	the	other	a	capacity	for	
esoterically	violent	predatory	action.		
THE MORAL CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE
	 Muinane	and	other	People	of	the	Center’s	self-depictions	and	critiques,	
as	well	as	the	Speeches	themselves	and	other	discourses,	tied	together	the	
morality	and	efficacy	of	individuals’	uses	of	Speeches.		One	axiom	I	found	
them	to	express	was	that	if	Speeches	were	immorally	transmitted,	acquired,	
or	 deployed,	 they	 would	 not	 function	 well.	 	 If	 deployed	 in	 a	 formally	
correct	manner	and	from	a	moral	position,	they	would	necessarily	produce	
desirable	results.		Similarly,	a	general	moral	condition	of	knowledge	was	
that	it	be	used	for	a	proper	purpose,	and	conversely,	such	purpose	could	only	
be	achieved	if	the	necessary	knowledge	was	deployed	morally.		However,	
whether	a	particular	instance	of	the	transmission,	use	or	acquisition	of	some	
knowledge	was	moral	or	not	was	obviously	a	question	of	interpretation	and	
at	times	of	negotiation.		In	any	case,	people	produced	numerous	claims	to	
the	morality	of	 their	uses	of	knowledge,	and	also	many	contestations	of	
others’	claims.		
	 Ultimately,	 knowledge—namely,	 Speeches—could	 only	 be	 gauged	
as	 “true”	 (míya-)	 a posteriori,	when	 it	 “dawned”	 or	 “made	 something	 be	
seen,”	that	is,	when	its	effects	became	materially	perceptible	and	beneficial.	
Several	mambeadores	 affirmed	 that	 the	 only	 “true”	 knowledge	 was	 that	
which	pertained	to	the	Cool	Path	or	Path	of	Life.		This	“path”	led	from	
the	maloca to	the	garden.		According	to	Pedro’s	explanation	of	this	claim,	
it	meant	that	the	only	worthwhile	knowledge	involved	the	production	of	
foodstuffs	and	ritual	substances,	and	through	these,	in	the	multiplication	
of	Real	People.	 	True	Speeches	 led	 to	material	abundance,	 satiety,	good	
health,	tranquil	community	life	and	demographic	increase.12	
	 In	 oft-repeated	 abstract	 accounts,	 a	mambeador	 who	 had	 plenty	 of	
mambe	 and	 tobacco	 paste	 showed,	 by	 virtue	 of	 his	 possession	 of	 such	
substances,	 that	 his	 Speeches	 had	 “dawned”	 and	 that	 he	 was	 indeed	 a	
moral,	 knowledgeable	 person.	 	Along	 similar	 lines,	men	 and	women	of	
the	Center	told	me	on	different	occasions	that	a	woman	who	possessed	
a	 beautiful,	 well-weeded	 garden	 and	 who	 always	 had	 an	 abundance	 of	
foodstuffs	 available	 showed	 that	 she	 indeed	 knew	 the	 counsels	 of	 the	
Speech	of	Advice	and	was	therefore	a	“true	woman.”		In	abstract	accounts,	
the	existence	of	well-behaved,	healthy	children	and	grandchildren	was	also	
8
Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America
http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/tipiti/vol4/iss1/10
                  Instrumental Speeches, Morality & Masculine Agency         207
deemed	evidence	of	knowledge	dawning.		These	abstractions	were	often	
concretized	in	evaluations	of	individuals.
	 Pablo	and	other	mambeadores	stated	that	a	person	could	know	every	
counsel	of	the	Speech	of	Advice	or	a	great	many	Speeches	of	Apprising,	
in	the	sense	of	having	consigned	them	to	memory.		But,	if	his	knowledge	
did	not	result	 in	well-behaved	children,	 in	the	healing	of	diseases,	or	 in	
the	 production	 of	 foodstuffs	 and	 ritual	 substances,	 others	 would	 claim	
that	he	did	not	really	know,	and	that	his	Speeches	were	lies.	 	So	merely	
memorized	recipes	and	Speeches	were	not	in	themselves	true	knowledge.	
True	knowledge	was	that	which	the	individual	had	not	only	committed	to	
memory	but	had	furthermore	made	dawn.		
	 Failures	 to	make	knowledge	dawn	were	a	matter	of	much	attention	
and	denunciation.		Jonás’s	was	a	case	in	point:	people	claimed	that	he	was	
very	knowledgeable	of	Speeches	of	Apprising,	and	that	he	was	a	pleasant	
man	and	a	competent	interlocutor	in	a	mambeadero.  Nonetheless,	they	also	
claimed	that	his	knowledge	was	false,	for	his	very	lifestyle	of	itinerancy	and	
material	poverty	showed	that	his	beautiful	Speeches	had	not	dawned.13		In	
another	instance,	Jafet	likened	David	to	jaguars	and	anacondas,	who	in	a	
certain	Speech	of	Apprising	appeared	as	leaders	whose	Speeches	sounded	
beautiful,	but	were	mere	false	appearance.		They	did	not	dawn,	but	instead	
led	to	death,	hunger,	and	other	tribulations	for	their	people.
	 If	moral	knowledge	pertained	to	the	Cool	Path,	and	in	general	to	the	
production	of	Real	People,	its	spurious	counterpart	was	sorcery.		Sorcery	
was	dangerous,	immoral	knowledge	that	led	to	the	destruction	of	people	
and	communities,	but	it	also	pleased	those	who	lacked	discernment	because	
of	its	great	destructive	efficacy.		Saul	told	me	a	certain	part	of	a	Speech	of	
Apprising	that	stressed	the	clear	contrast	between	proper	knowledge	and	
sorcery.		It	followed	a	moral	self-portrayal	in	which	he	claimed	to	reject	
sorcery.		The	Apprising	went	something	like	this:	
	
At	First	Time,	some	animals	claimed	that	the	creator’s	True	Speech	was	not	
true.		They	preferred	to	explore	sorcerous	knowledge,	and	collected	substances	
for	sorcery.		Soon,	however,	they	found	themselves	hungry	and	incapable	of	
producing	food.		They	sought	the	creator	to	beg	him	for	manioc	and	other	
garden	produce.		He	told	them,	“Eat	your	sorcery	stones!”		They	answered,	
“Those	stones	do	not	bring	satiety!”		“Then	why	do	you	use	them	at	all?!”	he	
demanded	angrily,	and	then	condemned	them	to	a	miserable	life	of	scavenging	
and	eating	filth,	and	to	be	game	animals	for	Real	People	to	eat.
	 Again,	this	mythical	event	highlighted	that	the	proper	use	of	knowledge	
was	 for	production	that	 led	 to	satiety—a	state	of	cool	 satisfaction—and	
derogated	 its	misuse	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 sorcery.	 	 Sorcery	 did	 produce	
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results,	but	these	were	ultimately	detrimental	to	the	user.		
	 Whether	a	certain	use	of	knowledge	was	moral	or	sorcerous	was	not	
always	clear.		As	with	other	moral	aspects	of	knowledge,	it	was	in	fact	a	
matter	open	to	contestation.		For	instance,	whereas	Immanuel	found	that	
his	use	of	his	animal	tooth-and-claw	necklace	in	predatory	healing	rites	was	
the	irreproachable	harnessing	of	evil	agents	he	himself	had	domesticated	
(and	thus	moralized),	Pedro	and	Pablo	found	it	to	be	trafficking	with	evil	
agents,	and	therefore	to	be	sorcerous.		They	liked	Immanuel	well	enough,	
but	stated	that	the	day	would	come	when	the	beings	of	the	necklace	would	
kill	him.		
	 There	was	an	almost	standardized	autobiographical	anecdote	among	
Muinane	men	concerning	their	rejection	of	sorcery.		I	heard	independent	
versions	from	Immanuel	and	Saul,	and	then	from	several	young	Uitoto	and	
Muinane	men.	 	They	told	me	about	their	 ignorant	and	 innocent	youth,	
when	 they	 had	 been	 interested	 in	 acquiring	 sorcerous	 knowledge	 with	
which	to	harm	enemies,	or	in	hearing	about	it.		Each	had	asked	his	father	
or	some	other	elder	about	this.		The	wiser	elder	had	advised	each	overly	
eager	youth	against	such	deadly	interests,	which	led	to	no	production.		In	
each	case,	the	elder	had	instructed	the	youth	to	“look	at	where	those	who	
used	sorcery	ended	up.”		Invariably,	in	the	myths	and	histories	alluded	to,	
sorcerers	had	died	awful	deaths	and	their	lineages	had	come	to	tragic	ends.	
I	am	not	sure	that	these	pedagogical	events	actually	transpired	in	each	of	
their	personal	histories.	 	Rather,	 I	believe	 that	oft-repeated	 stories	 such	
as	this	one,	which	involved	interactions	between	stereotypical	characters	
(e.g.,	 overly	 eager	 and	 ignorant	 youths	 and	 wise	 elders)	 reiterated	 key	
contrasts	and	associations	of	a	vocabulary	of	moral	evaluations	central	to	
people’s	accounts	of	themselves.		Their	frequent	repetition	and	their	moral	
plausibility	made	them	an	intimate	part	of	their	lives.		What	was	important	
about	them,	after	all,	was	that	they	were	moral	truths.14	
	 The	self-portrayals	and	criticisms	of	People	of	the	Center	concerning	
knowledge	very	often	highlighted	one	or	several	other	moral	and	aesthetic	
considerations.		Such	considerations	were	often	premised	on	the	agential	
character	of	the	Speeches,	which	were	understood	to	be	prone	to	anger,	
disgust,	jealousy,	and	sulking	when	mistreated.		In	such	cases,	“morality”	
was	a	matter	of	treating	an	agent	respectfully,	for	instrumental	purposes.	
In	other	cases,	though,	people’s	portrayals	highlighted	their	own	coolness,	
benevolence,	 discipline,	 and	 correctness	 in	 matters	 of	 knowledge,	 and	
bracketed	the	intrinsic	agency	of	the	Speeches.		
	 The	 formal	 correctness	 of	 deployments	 of	 knowledge	was	 always	 a	
salient	consideration.		There	was	much	rhetoric	about	the	requirement	of	
using	Speeches	only	when	needed,	and	in	the	correct	place,	at	the	right	
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time,	and	with	the	appropriate	accoutrements.		The	claims	could	posit	that	
the	Speeches	themselves	required	it,	as	agents,	or	else	they	could	simply	
highlight	the	virtuous	orthodoxy	of	the	person.		One	formal	requirement	
of	many	Speeches	was	 that	 they	 be	 deployed	 in	 the	 form	of	 dialogues.	
Individuals	 often	 emitted	 judgments	 of	 particular	 instances	 of	 speech	
deployment,	 or	 of	 their	 own	 and	 others’	 talents	 in	 this	 regard.	 	 Pablo,	
for	instance,	told	me	his	son	lacked	the	ability	to	“give	him	strength”	in	
dialogue.		I	witnessed	one	dialogue	between	them	and	found	that,	indeed,	
the	 son	 lacked	 expertise	 as	 a	 what-sayer,	 because	 he	 merely	 answered	
his	father	with	“hmmms”	rather	than	with	the	more	varied	repertoire	of	
responses	of	an	experienced	interlocutor.		This	lack	of	skill	constituted	an	
aesthetic	problem,	but	it	had	implications	concerning	the	efficacy	of	the	
Speeches	deployed,	as	well	as	the	public	evaluation	of	Pablo	and	of	his	son.	
People	spoke	critically	about	them,	saying	that	Pablo	had	not	raised	his	
children	properly	in	that	regard,	and	that	his	son	had	not	been	attentive	to	
the	ways	of	the	clan.		
	 Another	common	moral	claim	of	individuals	was	that	they	had	acquired	
their	knowledge	properly:	from	the	right	elders,	in	correct	circumstances,	
following	the	proper	protocols,	and	so	on.		Moral	obligations	concerning	
transmission	 went	 both	 ways.	 	 Since	 the	 Speeches	 themselves	 were	
sentient	 beings	 and	were	 tied	 to	 agential	 substances,	 their	 transmission	
and	 acquisition	 required	 care.	 	 Knowledge	 transmitted	 inappropriately	
could	 attack	 either	 giver	 or	 receiver,	 or	 simply	 sulk	 and	 cease	 to	work.	
For	 instance,	 Speeches	 could	 become	 resentful	 if	 not	 properly	 paid	 for	
with	tobacco,	and	could	harm	their	original	owner	for	not	treating	them	
as	something	dear	to	him.		Knowledge	acquired	too	quickly	and	in	excess	
could	madden	receivers,	and	it	was	the	obligation	of	concerned	elders	to	
make	 sure	 they	 did	 not	 give	 others	 Speeches	 carelessly.	 	 (See	Overing	
1993:191–211;	 and	 Lagrou	 intra,	 on	 the	 dangers	 of	 excess	 among	 the	
Piaroa	and	Kaxinawa	respectively).
	 People	of	the	Center	also	made	much	of	the	ownership	of	knowledge.	
Such	ownership	was	linked	to	the	very	nature	of	groupings	and	individuals,	
as	 represented	 in	Speeches	of	Apprising,	and	 in	much	other	 rhetoric	as	
well.	 	The	 idea	 was	 that	 the	Grandfather	 of	 Creation	 had	 created	 the	
different	patrilines,	clans,	and	language	groups	in	different	ways,	and	had	
given	to	each	its	strain	of	tobacco	and	its	Speeches.		These	Speeches	were	
transmitted	patrilineally,	in	the	case	of	tobacco	constituting	the	very	bodies	
of	members	of	patrilines	and	clans,	who	were	thus	consubstantial	among	
themselves	and	therefore	supposedly	similar	in	subjectivities,	proclivities,	
and	vulnerabilities.		Therefore,	though	many	Speeches	and	rituals	were	the	
same	between	different	groups,	some	were	unique	to	particular	lineages	and	
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clans	 because	 they	 addressed	unique	 aspects	 of	 lineage-specific	 creation	
and	bodily	constitution.		Ignoring	such	knowledge,	or	preferring	another	
group’s	knowledge,	were	dangerous	matters	that	could	generate	trouble	or	
criticism	for	the	unorthodox.		Immanuel,	for	instance,	once	told	me	he	had	
followed	proper	Muinane	protocols	when	bringing	his	wooden	drum	into	
the	maloca,	while	his	own	father	had	unwisely	had	his	brought	in,	many	
years	before,	following	a	Uitoto	rather	than	Muinane	protocol.		
ON THE DESIRE FOR PREDATORY AGENCY
	 People	of	the	Center’s	accounts	of	the	nature	of	agency	in	the	cosmos	
were	 linked	 to	 their	 inevitable	 ambivalence	 towards	 violence,	 hate,	 and	
anger.		The	latter	were	often	mentioned	as	the	most	salient	manifestations	
of	animal	thoughts/emotions.	 	These	emotions	were	the	object	of	many	
abstract	prescriptions	that	warned	against	their	capacity	to	destroy	life	and	
relationships,	and	were	likely	to	be	harshly	criticized	when	actually	made	
manifest.		Nonetheless,	men	in	particular	seemed	to	be	obsessed	with	the	
idea	of	being	capable	of	angrily	killing,	harming,	scolding,	or	proscribing	
evil	or	threatening	agents	in	the	world	(whether	anthropomorphic	or	not).	
Their	 expressions	of	 this	 ranged	 from	 (1)	David’s	 and	Abel’s	numerous	
reports	about	having	 scolded	 this	or	 that	person,	 through	 (2)	 the	 light-
hearted	bravado	of	Lázaro’s	youngest	son,	a	youth	of	seventeen	or	so,	who	
addressed	a	bolt	of	lightning	by	saying	to	an	audience	of	a	boatful	of	brothers,	
sisters,	and	myself:	“You	try	that	again	and	I’ll	grab	you	by	the	tail!”	to	(3)	
claims	of	Immanuel’s	that	seemed	to	require	greater	commitment	to	the	
suspension	of	disbelief.		He	often	produced	Speeches	to	disarm	thunder,	
and	once,	when	I	asked	him	why	vampires	killed	his	chickens	but	would	
not	bite	those	of	us	who	lived	in	his	maloca,	he	said:	“Do	you	think	that	I	
would	allow	them	to	live,	if	they	did	that?		They	are	afraid!”	
	 I	believe	part	of	the	reason	for	their	ambivalence	lay	in	the	predatory	
nature	of	agency	as	they	understood	and	valued	it.	 	To	be	moral	human	
beings	and	men	of	knowledge,	men	not	only	had	to	be	cool	and	sociable,	
they	also	had	to	prey	upon	evil	agential	beings	in	the	world,	beings	with	
whom	some	interlocution	was	possible.		However,	the	powers	that	made	
them	dangerous	 to	 evil	 beings	were	 also	 capable	 of	 harming	 them	 and	
other	innocent	human	beings.15
	 Such	was	the	interest	of	a	few	individuals	in	dangerous	agency	or	in	
portraying	 themselves	 as	 dangerously	 agential,	 that	 some	 would	 admit	
to	knowledge	of	sorcery.		Onan	once	told	me	that	he	pitied	anyone	who	
would	try	to	ensorcell	him	or	his	people,	explaining	that	 it	was	easy	for	
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him	 or	 anyone	who	 knew	 good	 Speeches	 to	 “flip	 them	 over”	 and	 turn	
them	into	sorcerous	spells	that	sickened	or	killed	human	victims.		Pedro	
and	his	brothers	would	probably	have	deemed	such	interest	and	claims	to	
manifest	an	immoral	constitution,	something	Onan	knew	well.		I	see	such	
claims	rather	as	privileging	the	ideal	of	being	an	agent	capable	of	dealing	
effectively	 with	 outside	 threats,	 and	 in	 Onan’s	 case,	 as	 an	 intentional	
portrayal	of	himself	as	capable	of	great	esoteric	violence.		
	 Onan’s	father	Saul	once	expressed	to	me	his	interest	in	developing	a	
new	capacity	to	harm	people	through	esoteric	knowledge.		He	had	heard	
about	 a	 practice	 (I	 imagine	 it	 was	Vodou)	 that	 involved	 using	 pictures	
of	 victims	 in	 order	 to	 hurt	 them,	 and	he	wanted	me	 to	 teach	him	 this	
skill.		I	do	not	recall	my	immediate	reaction,	but	he	quickly	added	that	he	
would	not	use	it	to	ensorcell	people,	only	for	defense.		Subsequent	events	
persuaded	me	that	he	had	a	certain	human	target	in	mind.		I	believe	he	
knew	that	this	would	be	deemed	sorcery	by	some	of	his	fellow	Muinane	
mambeadores,	but	also	that	he	really	desired	an	efficacious,	death-dealing	
capability,	even	one	as	redolent	of	sorcery	as	the	one	in	question.16	
A MORAL EXEMPLAR
	 One	of	the	most	seductive	ideals	of	masculine	agency	among	People	
of	the	Center	and	some	neighbouring	groups	was	reified	in	the	image	of	
the	knowledgeable	mambeador,	seated	in	an	unwavering	posture,	“rooted”	
in	his	place,	attending	single-mindedly	to	moral,	esoteric	matters	 in	the	
mambeadero and	effectively	defending	himself	and	his	people	from	evil.17	
For	the	mambeadero	was	indeed	the	place	par excellence	for	the	deployment	
of	knowledge.	 	 It	was	 from	a	 seated	position	 in	 this	 circle	of	 seats	 that	
a	 man’s	 Speeches	 were	 best	 buttressed	 and	 empowered	 by	 the	 tobacco	
and	other	substances	of	his	lineage,	by	the	agencies	consigned	in	the	very	
makings	of	his	maloca,	and	by	his	kin.	 	Moreover,	some	Speeches	could	
only	be	produced	(at	night)	in	the	mambeadero	of	the	maloca	of	a	member	
of	the	patriline	to	which	those	Speeches	belonged.		
	 In	 talking	 about	 “sitting	 firmly,”	 several	 mambeadores	 brought	 into	
account	a	connection	between	a	mambeador’s	life	process	and	the	tobacco	
plant’s.		Both	started	life	as	vulnerable	beings.		The	tender	young	tobacco	
plant	that	first	sprouted	from	the	ground	was	still	so	fragile	and	loose	that	
any	 breeze	 could	uproot	 it.	 	 Similarly,	 a	 boy	 or	 recently	 initiated	 youth	
could	easily	be	swayed	from	the	“path”	of	proper	development	and	become	
flitting,	undisciplined,	weak,	and	inconstant.		With	time	and	proper	care,	
however,	both	the	mambeador	and	the	tobacco	matured.		Mature	tobacco	
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had	deep,	strong	roots	that	no	wind	could	uproot.		The	Nonuya	man	who	
best	explained	this	to	me	spoke	admiringly	about	the	mature	mambeador,	
who	had	 a	 tobacco	“tree”	 rooted	 in	 his	 abdomen.	 	 	 It	was	 this	 tobacco	
tree	 that	 kept	 him	 firmly	 rooted	 at	 the	moral	 center	 of	 his	 world,	 the	
mambeadero.	 	 Such	 a	 man	 featured	 a	 keen	 awareness	 of	 propriety	 and	
impropriety,	and	had	the	strength,	the	control,	and	the	presence	of	mind	
to	reject	all	temptation	to	misbehave	and	violate	the	prescriptions	of	his	
forefathers.	 	 He	 recognized	 what	 knowledge	 belonged	 to	 him	 and	 his	
people,	and	what	belonged	to	others.		Unlike	a	flitting	youth,	the	“wind”	
of	others’	knowledge	did	not	unseat	him	or	seduce	him	into	forgetting	his	
own.	 	Furthermore,	 in	 the	process	of	aging	and	transforming	 into	paste	
as	described	in	Speeches	of	Apprising,	tobacco	becomes	an	unstoppable	
predator	that	can	destroy	all	enemies.		Ideally,	this	is	also	true	of	men.
	 That	men	 and	women	 found	 the	highly	 aesthetic	 picture	 of	 a	man	
sitting	firmly	in	a	mambeadero	to	be	an	ideal	of	agency	seemed	to	me	to	
be	evident	as	well	in	their	use	of	the	term	“to	sit”	as	a	common	metonym	
to	refer	to	a	person’s—a	man’s,	but	also	sometimes	a	woman’s—judicious	
reaction	to	important	challenges.	 	Numerous	times	I	witnessed	speakers	
producing	a	certain	gesture	to	accompany	this	metonymic	reference.		They	
would	half-sit	 in	an	 imaginary	seat	as	 if	with	elbows	solidly	planted	on	
their	knees	or	thighs,	hands	close	to	but	not	touching	their	heads.		They	
would	tighten	their	arm	muscles	in	a	quick,	visible	gesture.			This	produced	
a	recognizable	semblance	of	a	mambeador.		
	 The	 persuasiveness	 of	 this	 image—its	 promise	 of	 agency	 and	
morality—buttressed,	and	was	 in	turn	buttressed	by,	 its	association	with	
rhetoric	about	and	practices	of	virilocal	postmarital	residence,	patrilineal	
corporativity	and,	for	Muinane	people,	if	not	other	People	of	the	Center,	
the	patrilineal	inflection	of	their	kinship	terminology.
	 I	recall	an	instance	when	a	Yukuna	woman	who	happened	to	live	in	a	
Muinane	community	told	David	that	since	he	was	a	traditional	leader,	he	
ought	to	stop	traveling	to	meetings	in	other	communities	and	cities,	and	
to	sit.		She	protested	that	he	was	no	longer	a	young	man	to	be	traipsing	
around.	 	His	 task	 now	was	 to	 sit	 and	 to	 guard	 his	 people	 from	within	
the	mambeadero.	 	David	was	deeply	offended	by	this,	though	he	himself	
had	requested	that	all	who	had	criticisms	produce	them	right	there,	rather	
than	in	his	absence.		He	retorted	that	his	community	was	thankless,	and	
that	he	had	nobody	trustworthy	to	send	off	to	meetings,	or	even	worthy	
interlocutors.		
	 Immanuel’s	brother	Aurelio	provided	me	with	a	nice	description	of	a	
stereotypical	man	of	knowledge,	which	reiterated	as	well	the	association	
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between	agency,	masculinity	and	the	mambeadero:	“That	man	may	speak	as	
if	scolding,	but	it	is	only	from	the	throat	outwards.		Inside,	he	has	a	calm,	a	
love	…	One	hears	him	conversing	pleasantly	in	the	mambeadero,	sometimes	
joking,	with	enthusiasm	…	but	that	very	man	can	say	“Dáigéjííraana!”	(Do	
not	rain!),	and	the	rain	stops.”		This	anecdote	cited	an	ideal	of	masculine	
agency	 that	 featured	 a	 combination	of	 sociability	 and	benevolence	with	
great	esoteric	capability.		
QUOTING OTHERS IN CLAIMS TO KNOWLEDGE
	 Many	of	the	self-portrayals	individual	People	of	the	Center	produced	
described	 the	 speaker	 with	 quoted	 evaluations	 by	 third	 parties.	 	These	
descriptions	 showed	 me	 that	 people	 were	 attentive	 to	 others’	 views	 of	
them,	or	at	 least	that	positing	third	person	views	to	describe	or	account	
for	themselves	was	acceptable	(see	Oakdale	2005).		There	was	much	else	
in	 their	 everyday	 talk	 that	 indicated	 that	 they	were	 keenly	 attentive	 to	
others’	perceptions	and	judgments	of	them.		The	call	for	such	attentiveness	
was	even	formulaic	in	the	Speech	of	Advice,	where	many	counsels	warned	
youths	that	if	they	behaved	in	certain	ways,	others	would	criticize,	ask	who	
of	their	kin	raised	them	so	carelessly,	and	so	on.		Furthermore,	people	were	
explicitly	aware	of	the	barrage	of	critical	commentary	constantly	going	on	
in	their	own	and	neighbouring	communities.		
	 Caleb,	 a	 Uitoto	 man	 married	 to	 a	 Muinane	 woman,	 proffered	 a	
particularly	nice	example	of	a	self-portrayal	in	which	the	speaker	quoted	
another’s	evaluation	of	him.		However,	his	self-portrayal	had	an	interesting	
twist.		The	character	who	portrayed	Caleb	as	knowledgeable,	and	whose	
voice	he	animated,	was	the	spirit	of	a	dead	man	with	whom	Caleb	said	he	
had	spoken	in	a	yagé	vision.		
	 On	the	occasion	in	question,	Caleb,	speaking	in	Spanish,	told	several	
of	us	seated	with	him	in	the	mambeadero	about	discovering	that	it	had	been	
his	now	dead	uncle	Nimrod	who	had	ensorcelled	and	thereby	killed	many	
people	in	the	region	in	previous	years.		Caleb	said	his	mother	had	prepared	
yagé	for	him	and	that	upon	drinking	it	he	had	had	ugly,	unpleasant	visions.	
Nonetheless,	in	his	vision	he	had	arrived	at	his	uncle’s	mambeadero,	and	had	
seen	the	uncle	surrounded	by	paraphernalia	for	sorcery.		“It	is	you,	uncle!”	
Caleb	 claimed	he	had	 said,	 a	 phrase	 that	was	 both	 a	 standard	 greeting	
and	 an	 accusatory	 statement.	 	He	 described	 how	 his	 uncle	 had	 looked	
at	 him	 and	 said,	 “I,	 who	 remained	 undiscovered	 by	 elders	 and	men	 of	
knowledge,	am	now	discovered	by	a	mere	orphan!”		I	understood	Nimrod’s	
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contribution,	as	acted	out	by	Caleb,	to	express	a	mix	of	irritation,	surprise,	
and	admiration.
	 Here,	Caleb	was	making	a	claim	to	esoteric	perspicacity	and	superior	
knowledge.		Yagé	was	widely	deemed	in	the	region	to	have	an	all-revealing	
character,	for	supposedly	drinkers	could	“see	everything.”		They	could	see	
through	the	flesh	of	individuals	and	identify	sorcerous	pathogenic	objects	
placed	in	their	bodies.		They	could	witness	past	and	future	events,	including	
sorcerous	 rituals,	 and	 nothing	 they	 chose	 to	 look	 into	 would	 remain	
a	mystery.	 	However,	 they	 also	 stated	 that	 great	 sorcerers	 could	 escape	
lesser	 people’s	 sight.	 	Only	 somebody	 (usually	 an	 old	man)	well	 versed	
in	the	esoteric	and	with	great	knowledge	could	“catch”	a	reportedly	able	
sorcerer	like	Nimrod.		However,	Caleb	cited	a	fairly	commonly	used	image	
that	sometimes	subverted	the	emphasis	on	age	as	a	condition	of	wisdom:	
that	of	the	orphan.		Orphans,	bereft	of	kin,	unprotected,	without	mentors	
focusing	on	them,	nonetheless	appeared	in	some	Speeches	of	Apprising18	
as	uniquely	capable	sages	who	became	knowledgeable	and	agential	while	
listening	to	others’	stories	and	doing	their	menial	jobs,	and	who	surged	from	
anonymity	and	low	status	to	achieve	great	things.		Caleb	was	not	literally	
an	orphan,	in	the	sense	that	he	did	have	a	father.	 	However,	his	father’s	
patriline’s	 elders	 had	 been	murdered	 before	 he	 could	 learn	 from	 them,	
and	so	in	that	sense	he	had	been	orphaned	of	his	patriline’s	knowledge.	
By	claiming	to	be	an	orphan,	I	think,	Caleb	was	modeling	himself	after	
the	image	of	somebody	who	would	surprise	others	by	acquiring	skills	and	
agency	beyond	what	would	be	expected	of	him.		That	it	had	been	a	very	
knowledgeable,	if	evil,	old	man	who	had	purportedly	described	Caleb	this	
way	(when	Caleb	discovered	him),	as	opposed	to	it	being	merely	Caleb’s	
own	claim,	constituted	stronger	evidence	of	his	agency.		I	am	persuaded	
that	he	wanted	to	be	related	to	as	such	an	agent.		
ON THE EFFECTS OF MORAL SELF-PORTRAYALS
	 Let	me	briefly	consider	some	of	the	effects	actual	moral	self-portrayals	
actually	have,	or	might	have,	on	social	life.		A	final	anecdote	will	help	me	
do	so.		
	 Lazarus	was	telling	me	that	Abel,	a	young	man	from	another	clan,	had	
once	sat	with	him	in	his	mambeadero:			
He	(Abel)	said	to	me	(Lazarus):	“Yo ya tengo mando	[I	already	have	power].”	
He	always	aplasta [flattens,	causes	to	capitulate	or	be	silent]	Pedro	and	Pablo,	
and	all	they	say	to	him	is	“Íímino	[“Good”	or	“all	right,”	in	Muinane]	…	but	
that	day	I	blocked	him.		I	asked	him,	“And	who	gave	you	that	power?”		He	
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said	that	Saul,	Methuselah,	Immanuel	and	Lot.		So	I	said	to	him,	“So	let’s	see,	
where	is	it?		Where	is	that	of	which	you	speak?”		He	did	not	have	anything	
to	show,	so	I	said,	“One	should	never	say	that	if	one	has	nothing	to	show…	
and	less	so	to	me,	who	just	had	to	give	you	coca	and	tobacco	paste	because	
you	have	none	of	your	own.”		Then	I	said	to	him,	“Never	again	talk	to	me	
thus,	saying	trash	like	that.”		He	said	that	I	was	right,	and	that	he	had	learned	
an	important	point	that	day.		So	then	I	said,	“What	if	I	were	to	ask	you	to	
heal	that	boy	there?”		Benjamin	[a	baby]	was	sick	that	day,	trembling.		“Do	
you	know	how	to	stop	that?”		He	said	“No.”		So	where		does	that	leave	you,	if	
somebody	requests	that	you	do	so?19	
	 Abel	had	made	a	claim	to	knowledge	and	agency,	and	Lazarus	had	
treated	it	as	outrageous	in	the	circumstances,	highlighting	that	Abel	did	
not	even	have	tobacco	paste	or	coca	to	produce	as	evidence	and	support	
for	his	 claim.	 	As	 told	by	Lazarus,	he	 also	provided	 further	warning	of	
future	shame	to	Abel,	should	he	not	be	able	to	heal	a	child	when	requested	
to	 do	 so	 by	 others	 who	 heard	 his	 bragging.	 	 Lazarus	 achieved	 several	
things	through	this	anecdote.		First,	he	reproduced	an	image	of	agential	
knowledge	that	featured	production	and	healing	as	its	central	purposes,	and	
the	premise	that	there	was	a	certain	kind	of	evidence	for	such	knowledge.	
Second,	he	made	what	I	believe	was	his	intended	point,	namely,	that	he	
himself	was	a	tough	and	capable	mambeador	with	the	material	evidence	to	
back	this	up,	and	that	he	had	taught	a	young	upstart	a	lesson.20		Abel’s	own	
words,	directly	or	indirectly	quoted,	were	“evidence”	that	this	was	not	just	
Lazarus’s	account	but	also	Abel’s	perception.		Third,	he	contributed	to	the	
maintenance	of	the	footings	of	our	relationship.		Lazarus	was	my	host	at	
the	time,	and	frequently	pressed	upon	me	that	he	was	a	man	of	knowledge.	
As	usual,	I	listened	to	his	anecdotes	with	interest	and	responded	in	what	I	
believed	to	be	the	preferred	fashion.		In	this	case,	I	expressed	satisfaction	
upon	hearing	about	Abel	being	put	in	his	place	(I	was	sincerely	delighted).	
I	treated	him	in	such	a	way	that	it	was	clear	that	I	accepted	his	character	
as	a	man	of	knowledge.		Between	Lazarus’s	claims	and	questions	and	my	
own,	we	managed	to	be	on	excellent	footing.		
	 In	contrast	to	Lazarus’s	successful	claims,	and	through	the	refraction	
of	Lazarus’s	 account,	Abel’s	 own	moral	 self-portrayal	 to	 the	 effect	 that	
he	“had	power”	appears	to	me	to	have	been	infelicitous,	for	Lazarus	not	
only	did	not	accept	Abel’s	statement,	but	strongly	refused	the	egalitarian	
footings	 that	Abel’s	 tone	 and	 claim	would	 seem	 to	 have	 tried	 to	 posit	
and	enact.		This	was	also	an	example—though	a	rather	franker	one	than	
usual—of	the	kind	of	contestation	of	knowledge	that	People	of	the	Center	
know	to	be	likely.		
	 Anecdotes	 such	 as	 Lazarus’s	 (and	 Abel’s	 purported	 one)	 cite,	 and	
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depend	 upon,	 local	 accounts	 of	 human	 ontogeny,	 competence,	 and	
subjectivity	 for	 their	 intelligibility.	 	 Thus,	 one	 of	 the	 effects	 was	 that	
Lazarus	and	Abel	made	their	accounts	and	symbolic	associations	available	
anew	to	others,	including	me,	for	interpretation,	citation,	transformation,	
or	rejection.		Furthermore,	they	provided	listeners	and	interlocutors	with	a	
frame	for	the	interpretation	of	speakers’	actions.		In	this	sense	they	could	be	
“felicitous”	occurrences,	such	as	when	listeners	accepted	the	anecdotes	and	
were	willing	to	interpret	other	actions	of	the	speakers	in	their	light,	or	they	
could	be	“infelicitous,”	such	as	when	both	speakers’	telling	of	the	anecdotes	
and	other	actions	they	performed	were	taken	to	be	manifestations	of	some	
undesirable	feature	of	the	speakers,	and	when	the	respondents	contested	
the	 self-portrayal.	 	Finally,	 these	 self-portrayals	 and	 critiques,	 like	most	
other	 uses	 of	 language,	were	 parts	 of	 dialogues	 that	 set,	maintained,	 or	
changed	the	tone	of	interactions	and	the	footings	of	relationships.		
DISCUSSION
	 This	essay	is	the	product	of	my	curiosity	about	the	striking	number	
of	moral	 portrayals	 and	 critiques	 that	 individuals	 among	People	 of	 the	
Center	produced	concerning	matters	of	knowledge.		My	initial	claim	was	
that	they	were	motivated	by	a	certain	ideal	of	agency,	a	sense	of	what	was	
admirable	or	desirable	in	human	subjectivity	and	action,	and	by	awareness	
of	the	possibility	that	their	actions	and	subjectivities	could	be	framed	as	
immoral,	 animalistic,	 or	 otherwise	 inadequate	 by	 others	 around	 them.	
This	was	 a	 gendered	 ideal	 of	 agency.	 	On	 the	 one	 hand	 there	was	 the	
complex	 image	of	 the	“true	man”	(imíyagaifi),	a	man	of	knowledge,	 tied	
to	his	patriline	and	to	its	land,	and	capable	of	contributing	to	the	proper	
course	 of	 everyday	 life	 there,	 be	 it	 through	 his	 own	 sociable	 action	 or	
through	dangerous	predatory	knowledge	 and	esoteric	 violence.	 	On	 the	
other	 hand	 (which	 I	 did	 not	 explore	 here)	 there	was	 the	“true	woman”	
(imíyagaigo):	hard-working,	conscientious,	generous,	caring,	and	faithful.	
Both	men	 and	women	 tended	 to	 help	 reproduce	 these	 ideals,	 for	 both	
genders.		(On	differences	in	gendered	agencies,	see	Belaunde,	intra.)
	 To	 make	 my	 initial	 claim	 plausible,	 I	 discussed	 several	 matters:	
Muinane	accounts	of	agency—of	thoughts/emotions	and	action—in	the	
cosmos,	the	coherence	of	which	I	believe	contributed	to	their	compelling	
character;	 Muinane	 people’s	 attentiveness	 to	 and	 awareness	 of	 other’s	
perceptions	and	evaluations	of	their	subjectivities	and	actions;	instances	of	
talk	that	suggest	an	intent	to	persuade	others	of	speakers’	knowledge	and	
agency;	and	the	possible	effects	of	such	instances	of	talk.		
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	 Part	of	what	makes	this	claim	plausible	for	me	is	that	I	find	some	moral	
self-portrayals	of	People	of	the	Center	as	akin,	in	a	limited	sense,	to	the	
ostentatious	manly	gesturing	I	remember	deploying	in	my	own	society.		I	
remember	instances	in	my	adolescence	when	I	intentionally	and	reflexively	
produced	 a	 certain	 style	 of	 walking,	 talking,	 or	 otherwise	 interacting	
with	 others,	 in	 situations	when	 I	 suspected	 that	 I	would	 otherwise	 not	
be	 perceived	 in	 a	manner	 that	 fit	 in	with	what	 I	 aspired	 to	 be.	 	 I	 also	
recognized	that	other	individuals	did	the	same.		We	self-consciously	chose	
forms	of	ostentatious	expression	that	“corresponded”	to	our	aspired	ideal	
of	manliness—an	ideal	that	also	fits	into	a	more	or	less	coherent	cosmos.		I	
have	the	sense	that	others	also	may	have	questioned	individuals’	manliness,	
or	deemed	their	“manly”	gestures	phony	or	contrived,	but	“manliness”	itself	
as	a	norm	or	 ideal	was	only	 rarely	questioned.	 	 It	was	usually	 taken	 for	
granted	as	a	feature	of	agents	in	a	certain	kind	of	world.		As	I	understand	it,	
the	ideal	and	value	of	manliness	in	question	was	itself	a	social	achievement,	
the	processual	product	of	people’s	reiterations	of	the	forms	that	constitute	
manliness.21	
		 The	talk	about	knowledge	and	practices	of	knowledge	engaged	in	by	
Muinane	people	made	sense	in	the	context	of	a	certain	kind	of	world,	a	
coherent	one	in	which	the	nature	of	embodied	selfhood	was	tied	to	that	
of	livelihood	practices,	and	these	to	moral	action,	and	all	of	these	to	the	
character	of	inter-	and	intraspecific	relations	in	the	cosmos,	and	in	turn	to	
the	workings	of	great	rituals.		Theirs	was	a	world	populated	by	different	
kinds	of	beings	who	interrelated	in	certain	ways,	and	where	people’s	bodies	
were	 constituted	 by	 different	 substances	 that	 determined	 their	 identity,	
their	subjectivity,	their	actions,	and,	in	general,	their	agency.		In	that	world,	
people	were	axiomatically	moral.		However,	outside	agents—animals	and	
other	 morally	 inhuman	 beings—could	 impinge	 upon	 them	 and	 cause	
them	to	experience	and	manifest	immoral	subjectivities,	in	fact	extracting	
them	from	the	category	of	Real	People.		Through	rituals—small	everyday	
rituals,	or	occasional	great	ones—Real	People	were	made,	shaped,	healed,	
or	reconstituted,	to	ensure	their	health	and	sociability.
	 Muinane	 people’s	 talk	 about,	 and	 practice	 of,	 knowledge	 and	 the	
world,	 translated	 into	 persuasive,	 plausible,	 self-referring	 accounts	 of	
phenomenological	experience—of	thoughts/emotions	and	motivations—
and	 had	 a	 strong	 hold	 on	 them.	 	 It	 also	 shaped	 their	 grasp	 of	 agency,	
defining	a	sense	of	who	they	and	others	around	them	could	and	should	
be,	including	a	sense	of	what	was	manly	(or	properly	womanly),	admirable,	
and	dignified	action,	and	thus	how	they	could	and	should	act.		People	used	
the	terms	of	such	talk	 to	construe	their	circumstances,	 interactions,	and	
identities,	and	to	interpret	their	own	subjectivities.		I	witnessed	situations	
19
Instrumental Speeches, Morality, and Masculine Agency among Muina
Published by Digital Commons @ Trinity, 2006
218         Carlos David Londoño Sulkin
when	people	talked	about	their	own	past	thoughts/emotions	and	actions,	
basically	persuaded	that	these	had	not	been	their	own	but	rather	stemmed	
from	extrinsic	beings	and	substances.		In	some	cases,	this	seemed	to	have	
led	them	to	change	their	view	of	themselves	and	of	significant	others,	and	
to	act	on	the	basis	of	this	new	perception.
	 Their	images	of	desirable	agency	had	implications	to	much	in	everyday	
life	 in	 Muinane	 communities,	 including	 aspects	 of	 practice	 typically	
considered	as	subject	matter	for	anthropology,	such	as	social	organization.	
Muinane	and	Uitoto	men	tended	to	live	in	communities	that	were	mostly	
corporate	patrilines,	but	sometimes	they	did	not.		A	rich	description	of	their	
social	organizational	patterns	would	require	attention	to	the	motivations	
and	self-conscious	choices	of	individuals	who	created	these	patterns.		For	
instance,	the	ideal	of	rootedness,	of	being	tied	to	a	patriline	and	its	land,	
seemed	 to	 have	 been	 an	 important	 consideration	 for	 some	 men	 when	
deciding	not	to	leave	the	settlement	where	they	lived	with	their	brothers,	
and	where	there	was	much	unpleasant	conflict.		
	 Much	 of	 the	 talk	 of	 People	 of	 the	 Center	 showed	 that	 they	 were	
attentive	to	others’	evaluations	of	behavior,	and	a	few	times	I	heard	people	
refer	explicitly	to	the	critical	commentary	that	was	rife	in	their	communities.	
Thus,	 they	were	aware	of	 the	 likelihood	 that	 they	 themselves	would	be	
targeted	and	that	their	expressions	of	knowledge	or	claims	were	unlikely	
to	be	taken	at	face	value	by	all	and	accepted	as	true.		Contestations,	private	
or	open,	were	likely.		In	this	context—seeking	to	be	and/or	appearing	to	
be	specimens	of	an	ideal	of	moral	agency,	and	in	order	to	preempt	contrary	
interpretations	of	 their	 actions	and	 subjectivities—People	of	 the	Center	
were	 called	upon	 and	motivated	 to	produce	 talk	 and	other	 ostentatious	
manifestations	of	knowledge	and	morality.		They	did	so	in	order	to	persuade	
others	and	to	achieve	certain	effects.	 	I	am	of	the	opinion	that	this	was	
often	the	situation	that	led	individuals	to	produce	moral	self-portrayals.		
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Arango	(1995:304);	Echeverri	(1997:2);	Karadimas	(1997);	Griffiths	(1998);	and	
Londoño	Sulkin	(2001,	2004).
	 2.		 The	concern	in	question	is	something	I	picked	up	from	Joanna	Overing	
when	I	was	her	student.		It	was	then	reinforced	over	the	years	as	I	realized,	again	
and	again,	how	perspicacious	and	appropriate	her	emphasis	on	morality	was	when	
attending	to	Amazonian	(and	other)	people’s	social	 lives.	 	It	seems	clear	to	me	
that	her	interest	in	matters	of	morality	is	one	of	her	most	salient	legacies	and	the	
most	consistently	shared	feature	in	the	work	of	her	students	and	admirers	in	this	
volume.
	 3.	 	Mambe	was	 the	Spanish	 term	 for	 a	mix	of	 toasted	 and	powdered	 coca	
leaves	and	the	ashes	of	Cecropia	leaves.		The	verbal	form	was	mambear,	and	this	
was	done	by	packing	the	green	powder	into	the	cheeks	and	keeping	it	there	for	
slow	absorption.	 	The	main,	but	not	only,	place	 for	 coca	 consumption	was	 the	
mambeadero,	a	circle	of	seats	situated	somewhere	inside	the	maloca.		
	 4.		According	to	Conklin	(2001:38),	writing	about	Wari’	people,	“The	biggest	
control	on	individual	behavior	is	acute	sensitivity	to	public	opinion	and	criticism.”	
See	also	Basso	(1995:29).
	 5.		I	follow	Charles	Taylor’s	use	of	the	term	to	refer	to	“distinctions	between	
things	which	are	recognized	as	of	categoric	or	unconditioned	or	higher	importance	
or	worth	and	things	which	lack	this	or	are	of	lesser	value”	(Taylor	1985:3).
	 6.		I	must	note,	however,	that	these	pictures	did	not	constitute	an	exhaustive,	
monolithic	 culture.	 	 People	 sometimes	 spoke	 in	 different	 terms	 about	 these	
matters.
	 7.	 	 I	 am	 attending	 here	 to	 Cohen’s	 (1994:5,	 6)	 and	Overing	 and	 Passes”	
(2000)	call	for	attention	to	individual	consciousness,	and	to	Taylor’s	(1985:294)	
arguments	 to	 the	effect	 that	human	beings	are	 self-interpreting	animals	whose	
interpretations	involve	qualitative	distinctions	of	worth.		
	 8.	 	 The	 Spanish	 term	 “conocimiento propio”	 has	 no	 simple	 translation	 in	
Muinane.		However,	the	linguist	Consuelo	Vengoechea	(personal	communication)	
refers	 to	 it	 as	 “Ifásitu,”	 following	 an	 informant’s	 statement.	 	 I	 understand	 that	
Muinane	term	merely	to	mean	“all	parts”	or	“the	whole	thing,”	and	not	to	be	a	
univocal	name	for	the	category	of	knowledge.		Vengoechea	(1995)	has	carried	out	
research	on	the	Muinane	language	(see	also	Landaburu	1996).		
	 9.		Both	men	and	women	stressed	that	women	did	not	have	the	“capacity”	for	
conocimiento propio—they	 found	 it	not	 to	 suit	women’s	bodily	constitution,	and	
vice	versa.	
	 10.		See	Echeverri’s	(1997:250)	excellent	example	of	a	performative	discourse	
among	 the	 Uitoto	 (without	 using	 the	 term	 “performative,”	 though).	 	 See	
also	Griffiths	 (1998:72,	 206)	 for	 other	 similar	 rites	 among	Uitoto.	 	Tambiah’s	
(1968:190–193)	lists	of	phrases	and	words	for	gardening	magic	in	Melanesia	is	
very	similar	to	People	of	the	Center’s.	
	 11.		The	title	of	my	piece	“Though	It	Comes	as	Evil,	I	Embrace	It	as	Good	
…”	(Londoño	Sulkin	2000:170–186)	 is	a	Muinane	aphorism	that	 refers	 to	 the	
desirability	of	“naming”	the	poisonous,	the	tragic,	the	undesirable,	the	disgusting,	
and	so	on,	into	their	“good”	counterparts.		
	 12.		Cf.	Santos-Granero	(1991:12)	and	Echeverri	(1997:195)	on	the	moral	
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use	of	knowledge	among	Yanesha	and	Uitoto	people	respectively.
	 13.		Beauty	can	be	a	manifestation	of	morality,	or	else	mere	appearance,	with	no	
real	substance	behind	it	to	guarantee	its	moral	results.		Cf.	Overing	(1985a:284).
	 14.	 	 Cf.	 Overing	 (1985b:167–169)	 on	 “truth”	 and	 moral	 coherence	 and	
correctness.	
	 15.		There	is	an	excellent	discussion	of	a	similar	existential	problem	among	
the	Piaroa,	in	Overing	(2006).
	 16.		On	the	near	identity	of	sorcerous	and	benevolent	shamanism,	see	Santos-
Granero	(1991:338);	Vidal	and	Whitehead	(2004:67,	76);	and	Wright	(2004:83).	
	 17.	 	Cf.	Griffiths	 (1998:163)	on	 the	concept	of	“sitting	firmly”	among	 the	
Uitoto,	and	Belaunde	(1992:103)	on	the	Peruvian	Airo-Pai’s	valuation	of	“erectness	
of	 posture”	 as	 a	manifestation	of	moral	 personal	 disposition.	 	Alès	 (2000:133–
151)	discusses	 both	“sitting”	 and	“standing”	 as	matters	 of	 attention	 among	 the	
Yanomami.	
	 18.		The	Uitoto	term	for	the	stories	that	Muinane	people	call	“Speeches	of	
Apprising”	is	“Ropes	of	the	Ancients”	(Echeverri,	personal	communication).
	 19.		This	is	an	excerpt	from	my	diary,	and	not	of	a	recorded	and	transcribed	
conversation.	
	 20.		I	do	not	mean	to	posit	that	language	carries	meaning.		Rather,	I	wish	to	
say	 that	we	deploy	 language	with	 intent,	and	others	make	 their	own	meanings	
out	of	it.		I	do	think	people	converge	somewhat	in	their	interpretations,	though	
differences	are	undeniable.		
	 21.		My	argument	here	is	inspired	by	Butler	(1993:288).
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